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1

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

v.

:

MICHAEL PATEFIELD,

:

Case No. 950736-CA

Priority 2

Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from convictions of possession of a
controlled substance (LSD), a third degree felony, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (Supp. 1995), possession of a
controlled substance (marijuana), a class B misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (Supp. 1995) and
possession of drug paraphernalia, also a class B misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37a-5(l) (1994), in the Seventh
Judicial District Court in and For San Juan County, State of
Utah, the Honorable Lyle R. Anderson, presiding.

This Court has

jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a3(2)(f) (Supp. 1995).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The following issues are presented on appeal:
1.

Did the trial court properly determine that what started

as a routine traffic stop for an equipment violation, and hence a
seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes, reverted to a voluntary
encounter once the arresting officer issued a verbal warning to
defendant and defendant, rather than simply proceeding on his
way, decided to replace his burned out license plate light and
the officer assisted him by illuminating the area with his
flashlight while defendant attempted to change the bulb?
The trial court's determination that the seizure reverted to
a voluntary encounter is most aptly described as a question of
law that is reviewed for correctness.

However, because of its

highly fact sensitive nature, the trial court's determination
should be afforded some discretion.

See generally State v. Pena,

869 P.2d 932, 935-939 (Utah 1994) (explaining analytical approach
for determining what standard of review and measure of discretion
should be afforded trial court determinations of fact sensitive
legal conclusions).
2.

Did the trial court properly determine that the

arresting officer had probable cause to believe that there may
have been open containers of alcohol in defendant's vehicle where
the officer smelled the odor of alcohol on defendant's breath,
saw an open u12-pack" of beer from which several containers were
missing, and both the open 12-pack and a cooler were in the
passenger compartment within reach of defendant and his
passenger?

2

This Court reviews "a trial court's determination of whether
a particular set of facts constitutes probable cause
nondeferentially for correctness, affording a measure of
discretion to the trial court."

State v, Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220,

225 (Utah App. 1995) (citations omitted).
CONSTITUTIONS PROVISIONS, STATUTES ANP RTOES
U.S. Const. Amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
STATEMENT OF TOE CASE
Defendant was charged with possession of a controlled
substance (LSD), a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. §58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (Supp. 1995), possession of a controlled
substance (marijuana), a class B misdemeanor, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (Supp. 1995) and possession of
drug paraphernalia, also a class B misdemeanor, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. §58-37a-5(l) (1994) (R. 1-2). Defendant filed a
motion to suppress evidence that was seized by police during a
warrantless search of his vehicle conducted on a public highway
(R. 11-12).

The trial court denied that motion (R. 88-93), and

defendant entered conditional pleas of guilty under which he
reserved the right to challenge the denial of his motion to
3

suppress on appeal (R. 20-21, 93-104) . (A copy of the trial
court's findings, which were made from the bench, is attached
hereto as addendum A.)
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The facts recited below are drawn from the transcript of the
hearing on defendant's motion to suppress and are recited in the
light most favorable to the trial court's findings.

State v.

Anderson, 283 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 (Utah 1996); State v, Pelfrnsy,
869 P.2d 4, 5 (Utah App. 1994).
On the night of April 28, 1995, Utah Highway Patrol Trooper
Rick Eldredge saw an older model Volkswagen van traveling on SR191 north of Monticello, Utah.

It was dark at the time, and

Eldredge noticed that the license plate light was burned out.
The trooper decided to stop the vehicle to issue a verbal warning
for failure to have the rear license plate illuminated as
required under Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-120(b) (1995) (R. 31-33).
Upon stopping the vehicle, Eldredge asked the driver for
identification.

The driver produced a driver's license that

indicated he was Michael Patefield, defendant in the instant
appeal.

Eldredge told defendant that he stopped him because his

license plate light was burned out, issued a verbal warning for
failure to have a properly illuminated license plate, and told

4

defendant to uget it fixed" (R. 33, 44) .*
Defendant explained that he had recently fixed the light and
asked if he could get out and fix it again.

Eldredge agreed that

he could, and the passenger, William Willey, retrieved a light
bulb from glove box and handed it to defendant(R. 33, 44).
Defendant and Eldredge walked to the rear of the vehicle,
and Eldredge held his flashlight so that defendant could see
better as he tried to replace the burned out bulb (R. 33, 45).
Defendant was unable to replace the bulb and decided to get some
tools out of his van.

Eldredge followed defendant as he went

around the passenger side of the van, opened the sliding door
just behind the front passenger seat and pulled out a red tool
box (R. 33-4).

Eldredge could see inside the van as he watched

defendant gather the tools he needed to fix the light. Among
other things, Eldredge saw a lot of food, backpacks, clothes and
coolers, which led him to conclude that the two men were going
camping (R. 34, 49).
Eldredge also saw several "12-packs" of beer next to the
sliding door.

One of the 12-packs had been opened, and it

appeared that about half of the containers were gone.

Once

defendant had the tools he needed, and he and Eldredge again

1

It was undisputed that Eldredge had by then returned
Patefield's driver's license and that Eldredge did not run either
a license or warrants check (R. 55).
5

moved to the rear of the vehicle so that defendant could fix the
light (R. 33-4) .
As defendant tried to fix the light, he and Eldredge visited
about where defendant and Willey had been and where they were
going (R. 34). Specifically, defendant said that he and Willey
were on their way to Lake Powell for a camping trip (R. 45).
During their conversation, Eldredge smelled the odor of
alcohol on defendant's breath.

He let defendant try to fix the

light, but defendant was again unable to do so.

Eldredge

eventually told him that they could "fix it later" (R. 35).
Eldredge told defendant he was concerned about the odor of
alcohol on defendant's breath and the open box of beer in the
van.

He then asked defendant if he had been drinking, and

defendant said that he had beer for dinner two or three hours
earlier (R. 35). Eldredge told defendant that he would like
check inside the van to make sure there were no open containers
of alcohol in the vehicle (R. 35).
Defendant went to the front of the van and told Willey that
"the officer wanted to look for open containers" and asked Willey
to "please get out" (R. 35). Willey got out of the van and
brought with him a dog that had been sitting on the back seat at
the rear of the van. Willey took the dog to the side of the road
and waited with defendant while Eldredge looked in the van (R.
35) .
6

The sliding door was still open, and Eldredge leaned across
the coolers and clothes so that he could look directly behind the
driver's seat.

There was a pile of coats or blankets behind the

driver's seat, and Eldredge lifted them up to make sure that no
open containers had been hidden beneath them (R. 35).
As Eldredge leaned into the van, he could smell the odor of
burnt marijuana coming from one of two "fanny packs" that were
laying in the center of the van on top of the food and clothing
(R. 35). The packs were "right in front of [Eldredge's] face,
probably six inches from [his] face" (R. 36). Eldredge backed
up, looked at defendant and said, "I can smell marijuana in one
or both of th[ose] fanny packs" (R. 36). When Eldredge said he
did not know exactly which one the smell was coming from,
defendant, "without saying a word, . . . reached in, grabbed one
of the fanny packs, zipped it open, [and] handed [Eldredge] a
marijuana pipe" (R. 36).
Eldredge looked at the pipe and took the fanny pack away
from defendant.

The trooper opened the fanny pack further and

saw that it contained several film canisters.

Defendant grabbed

one of the canisters and held it behind his back.

Eldredge stuck

out his hand and instructed defendant to give him the canister.
Defendant responded, "[n]o.

I'll be in a lot of trouble for this

one" (R. 36). Eldredge told defendant that he was already in
trouble, and defendant acted like he was going to throw the
7

canister (R. 36) .
As defendant turned, apparently to ready himself to throw
the canister, Eldredge grabbed him by the arm and pushed him into
the van and onto the passenger seat.

Eldredge "snatched" the

canister away from defendant, turned him around and handcuffed
him (R. 36) . Eldredge opened the canister and saw that it
contained what he believed to be LSD (R. 37).
Eldredge took defendant back to his patrol car, apprised him
of his rights under Miranda. and asked him if he understood his
rights.

Defendant said, My]es," and Eldredge asked him if he

would speak to him without having an attorney present (R. 37).
Defendant answered, "[i]t depends on what the question is[,]" and
Eldredge told defendant that he could "pick and choose" what
questions he wanted to answer because he (defendant) was
"basically the boss when it c[ame] to [answering or not answering
questions]" (R. 37). The only question that Eldredge asked
defendant was whether there were any more controlled substances
in the van, and defendant said, " [n]o" (R. 37).
After having defendant sit in his patrol car, Eldredge
approached Willey.

Eldredge told Willey that defendant was under

arrest for possession of LSD.

Eldredge also specifically told

Willey that he was not under arrest but indicated that he wanted
to ask him some questions. While Eldredge did not give Willey a
Miranda since he had already told him he was not under arrest,
8

Eldredge did tell Willey that he did not have to answer any
questions.

Willey indicated that he understood that he did not

have to answer Eldredge's questions, and Eldredge asked him if
there was any marijuana or other controlled substances in the van
(R. 37-8) . Willey did not say anything, but he "shook his head
no and shrugged his shoulders as if to say 'no' or 'I don't
know'" (R. 38).
Eldredge returned to the van and looked through the other
fanny pack.

It contained some marijuana inside of a film

canister, some "zig-zag" papers, a knife and some other personal
items but no identification (R. 38). Because neither defendant
nor Willey had claimed that fanny pack, Eldredge returned to his
patrol car and asked defendant if it was his. Defendant said
u

[n]o" and motioned that it belonged to Willey (R. 38). Eldredge

then asked Willey if he knew who owned the fanny pack, and Willey
said he did not know who it belonged to (R. 38).
Eldredge also found a bamboo pipe that appeared to have
marijuana residue on it in a backpack that was claimed by Willey
(R. 38-9).

Finally, Eldredge found a Tupperware bowl full of

marijuana underneath a mattress at the rear of the van (R. 39).
Eldredge told Willey that he was not going to arrest him but
that he was going to cite him for possession of drug
paraphernalia.

Eldredge then gave defendant the choice of either

consenting to having Willey drive his vehicle or having it towed
9

by a wrecker.

Defendant opted to allow Willey to drive the van,

and Willey agreed to do so (R. 39, 52). Defendant then told
Eldredge that he felt very sick and that he may have "soiled his
pants" (R. 39).
Eldredge told Willey that he would give him a citation for
possession of drug paraphernalia at the Public Safety Building
and took his driver's license.

He also explained that Willey

could then find out exactly how much it would cost to bail
defendant out of jail and told Willey to follow him to the Public
Safety Building (R. 39, 40, 52) .
As Eldredge took defendant to the Public Safety Building,
Willey followed behind him "very slowly" in defendant's van (R.
40, 51). Indeed, at some point, Eldredge even lost sight of
Willey (R. 51). That fact did not concern Eldredge, however,
because he was not going to arrest Willey since he believed there
was insufficient evidence to connect him to the drugs found in
defendant's van (R. 51-2).
By the time Eldredge and defendant arrived at the Public
Safety Building, Eldredge was concerned about defendant's
behavior.

Specifically, defendant was in a "cold sweat" and was

holding his stomach as if he were sick (R. 40). Suspecting that
defendant might be under the influence of LSD, Eldredge decided
to call Trooper Sanford Randall, a drug recognition expert who
knew more about the effects of LSD than did Eldredge. Randall
10

advised Eldredge to conduct some field sobriety tests (R. 40-1) .2
While waiting for Willey to arrive at the Public Safety
Building, Eldredge searched through the unclaimed fanny pack in
which he had already found some marijuana and zig-zag papers (R.
41, 52) . He found a Steamboat Springs, Colorado dog tag that was
rolled up in a zig-zag paper (R. 41-3).

Eldredge not only knew

that Willey was from Steamboat Springs, he also knew Willey had a
dog because the dog was with him in the van (R.' 41, 52) .
When Willey arrived at the Public Safety Building, Eldredge
met him in the lobby.

Eldredge asked Willey whow long he had

owned the dog[,]" and Willey replied "around seven years" (R. 42,
52-3).

Eldredge then told Willey that he suspected he owned the

fanny pack in which there was marijuana because the pack also
contained a dog tag that belonged to his dog.

Willey did not

respond to Eldredge's comment (R. 42).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court properly determined that the concededly
valid stop of defendant's vehicle reverted to a consensual
encounter.

Specifically, after Trooper Eldredge issued a verbal

warning about the burned out license plate light and told the
defendant he should "get it fixed," it was clear the traffic stop
was at an end.

Rather than simply proceeding on his way,

2

The results of the filed sobriety tests that Eldredge
administered on Patefield do not appear on the record on appeal.
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defendant voluntarily elected to see if he could fix the light
immediately.

The fact that Eldredge stayed on the scene and used

his flashlight to illuminate the area while defendant attempted
to fix the light does not mean the encounter was a continued
detention for Fourth Amendment purposes.

Rather, as the trial

court recognized, Eldredge "was just acting as any citizen would"
by helping defendant replace the faulty light (R. 88).
Eldredge's detection of the odor of alcohol on defendant's
breath, the presence of an opened 12-pack of beer with several
containers missing that -- along with a cooler -- was within
reach of defendant and his passenger justified the trooper's
remaining actions. As the trial court recognized, those
collective facts gave rise to probable cause to believe there
were open containers of alcohol in defendant's van.

Eldredge's

search of the van for open containers was therefore proper.

Once

Eldredge smelled the odor of burnt marijuana emanating from one
of two fanny packs, his decision to search those packs and the
rest of the van for controlled substances was proper.

The trial

court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress should therefore
be upheld and defendant's convictions affirmed.

12

ARCTMENT
POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT THE
INVESTIGATIVE STOP OP DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE REVERTED TO A
VOLUNTARY LEVEL ONE ENCOUNTER
In keeping with State v. Hiagins, 884 P.2d 1242 (Utah 1994),
and State v. Castner. 825 P.2d 699 (Utah App. 1992), the trial
court properly determined that what started as a routine traffic
stop, and hence a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes, reverted
to a voluntary encounter between defendant and Trooper Eldredge
once Eldredge issued a verbal warning to defendant for having a
burned out license plate light and told him to "get it fixed" (R.
44).

At that point, a reasonable person would have felt free to

leave, and the trial court properly determined that it was
defendant who voluntarily extended the encounter by deciding he
wanted to replace the burned out light bulb while Eldredge was
present (R. 88). The fact that Eldredge assisted defendant by
illuminating the area with his flashlight in no way demonstrates
that he "stayed and created the appearance of a continued
detention and investigation" as defendant argues on appeal. Br.
of Appellant at 6.

Rather, as the trial court found, defendant's

decision to fix the burned out light immediately was a "voluntary
act," and Eldredge "was just acting as any citizen would" by
helping defendant replace the burned out bulb (R. 88).
In determining the limits of police conduct during a traffic
13

stop, courts employ a two-prong analysis: "whether the officer's
action was justified at its inception, and whether [the resulting
detention] was reasonably related [in scope] to the circumstances
that justified the interference in the first place."
Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879 (1968).
v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131-1132 (Utah 1994).

Terry v.

Accord. State

Here, the trial

court found the initial stop was justified because the license
plate light of Patefield's van was burned out, a violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-120(b) (1995) (R. 88). Defendant concedes
that point on appeal.

Br. of Appellant at 6.

Defendant argues,

however, that Eldredge exceeded the scope of detention and that
an "unlawful detention in this case began, most conservatively,
at the point when the trooper gave a verbal warning and did not
allow the occupants to proceed on their way."
at 9.

Br. of Appellant

Defendant's assertion is based on both a misapprehension

of the facts as found by the trial court and a misapplication of
the pertinent law to the facts presented.
The Utah Supreme Court has made clear that
Once a person is seized for Fourth Amendment Purposes,
the seizure does not cease simply because the police
formulate an uncommunicated intention that the seized
person may go on his or her way. For the seizure to
end, it must be clear to the seized person, either from
the words of the officer or the clear import of the
circumstances, that the person is at liberty to go
about his or her business.
Higgins, 884 P.2d at 1244 (citation omitted).
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In this case, Eldredge issued a verbal warning to defendant
about the burned out licence plate light and told defendant "to
get it fixed" (R. 33, 44). It was undisputed that Eldredge was
no longer retaining defendant's driver's license or other
materials at that point, and Eldredge did not even run a license
or warrants check (R. 55). Defendant could have simply accepted
the trooper's warning and proceeded on his way.

Instead, after

explaining that he had just recently fixed the burned out light
and knowing that he had another replacement light bulb in his
glove compartment, defendant decided on his own accord that he
wanted to fix the problem immediately.
At the suppression hearing, defendant conceded that Eldredge
did not order or command him to fix the light immediately, and
the trial court found that defendant elected to do so on his own
volition (R. 61-6).

As such, the trial court properly determined

that the encounter between defendant and Eldredge from that point
forward was a level one, consensual police-citizen encounter. Cf.
Castner. 825 P.2d at 705 (noting that the defendant was no longer
the subject of a Fourth Amendment seizure where the officer had
returned his driver's license, issued a citation, and the
defendant voluntarily extended the encounter by questioning the
officer about where and how to take care of the citation and
asking the officer why he had asked if there were any weapons in
his vehicle).
15

Defendant's claim on appeal that Eldredge "stayed and
created the appearance of a continued detention and investigation
[by] shadow[ing defendant] as he attempted to fix the licence
plate light and get tools [from his van]" (Br. of Appellant at 6)
is an attempt to alter the facts as found by the trial court
without saddling the burden of showing that court's findings were
clearly erroneous.

It was the trial court's prerogative to make

findings about the nature and character of the interaction
between Eldredge and defendant.

The thrust of the trial court's

ruling evidences its determination that the encounter was not
confrontational or hostile but was instead cooperative and
friendly in nature.

Eldredge merely assisted defendant by

illuminating the area with his flashlight while defendant
attempted to replace the burned out bulb during the darkness of
night on the side of the highway.
Certainly, Eldredge could also have simply hopped in his
patrol car and left defendant to his own devices.

But, as the

trial court suggested, that is not what most citizens in
Eldredge's position would have done (R. 88). Instead, most
citizens would have stayed and helped defendant, and we should
expect at least that much if not more from members of our law
enforcement community.
In light of the facts as found by the trial court, "the
words of [Trooper Eldredge and] the clear import of the
16

circumstances" would have made clear to a reasonable person in
defendant's position that they were "at liberty free to go about
[their] business."

Higgins. 884 P.2d at 1244. The trial court's

conclusion that the level two traffic stop reverted to a level
one encounter should therefore be affirmed.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT ELDREDGE HAD
PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH DEPENDANT'S VAN FOR OPEN
CONTAINERS OF ALCOHOL
The trial court properly determined that the facts known to
Eldredge at the time he searched defendant's van provided
probable cause to believe there were open containers of alcohol
in the van.

This Court reviews "a trial court's determination of

whether a particular set of facts constitutes probable cause
nondeferentially for correctness, affording a measure of
discretion to the trial court."

State v. Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220,

225 (Utah App. 1995) (citations omitted).

Accordingly, this

Court Moes not conduct a close, de novo review of the trial
court's probable cause determination; rather, [it] review[s] the
placement of the legal fences which delimit the pasture of trail
court discretion to determine what constitutes probable cause."
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

So

reviewed, the facts presented to the trial court established
probable cause.
Determinations of whether probable cause exists require a
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common sense assessment of the totality of the circumstances
confronting the officer at the time of the search.
Dorsey. 731 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah 1986).

State v.

The facts need not

demonstrate with certainty that incriminating evidence will be
discovered:
In dealing with probable cause . . . as the very name
implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not
technical; they are factual and practical
considerations of every day life on which reasonable
and prudent [persons], not legal technicians, act. The
standard of proof is accordingly correlative to what
must be proved.

Pprsey, 731 P.2d at 1088 (quoting Brinegar v, United States/ 338
U.S. 160, 175, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 1310 (1949)).

Because probable

cause does not require certainty, u[t]he line between *mere
suspicion and probable cause . . . necessarily must be drawn by
an act of judgment formed in the light of the particular
situation and with account taken of all the circumstances.'" Id.
(quoting Brinegar. 338 U.S. at 176, 69 S. Ct. at 1311) .
Courts must also be mindful of the degree of proof required
to move an officer's belief to the level of probable cause.
Probable cause means xxa fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found[;]" that "requires only a . . .
substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of
such activity."
n.13 (1983).

Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213, 238, 243,44

As such, "[t]he quantum of evidence needed for

probable cause is significantly less than that needed to prove
18

guilt" Spurgeon. 904 P.2d at 226 (citation omitted), and it "does
not require more that a rationally based conclusion of
probability[.]" Dorsey. 731 P.2d at 1088. Rather, "probable cause
is only the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of
criminal activity." Spurgeon. 904 P.2d at 227 (citations
omitted).
In this case, Eldredge had more that a mere suspicion that
defendant's van contained evidence of a crime. As the trial
court implicitly recognized, the information known to Eldredge at
the time of the search would have prompted a "prudent,
reasonable, cautious police officer" to conclude that there was a
"substantial chance" the van contained open containers of
alcohol.
While defendant properly notes that Eldredge based his
probable cause assessment on the fact that defendant had alcohol
on his breath and that the van contained an open 12-pack from
which several containers were missing, defendant is wrong when he
asserts that "no other factors" supported Eldredge's suspicion of
open containers.

Br. of Appellant at ll.3 Specifically, the

reasonable inference from the evidence presented was that the

3

Defendant's assertion ignores the fact that, while the
trial court focused primarily on the odor of alcohol and presence
of 12-packs of beer (one of which was opened), the trial court
made clear that those two facts had to be considered "in view of
all the circumstances" (R. 89).
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open 12-pack of beer and the coolers were within defendant's and
Willey's reach because they were behind the front seat and by the
sliding door that opened on the side of the van.

That much can

be inferred from the fact that Eldredge, who searched the van
through the open sliding door, had to "lean over the coolers'7 as
he reached across to the other side of the van to lift up the
blankets and clothes that were "directly behind the driver's
seat." (R. 34-5) .
Under the totality of the circumstances, while Eldredge
candidly acknowledged that he did not suspect defendant was
impaired, it was reasonable for him to suspect that defendant may
have recently had a drink of beer and that the open beer
container was still in the van.

It may have been stashed behind

the driver's seat where Eldredge looked first, or it might have
been in one of the coolers.
The fact that Eldredge's suspicion about an open container
proved wrong does not mean that the trial court's finding of
probable caiuse was in error.

Rather, as the trial court

implicitly recognized (R. 91), a finding of probable cause is not
defeated simply because an officer's belief proves wrong:
Because many situations which confront officers in the
course of executing their duties are more or less
ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes on
their part. But the mistakes must be those of
reasonable [persons], acting on facts leading sensibly
to their conclusions of probability. The rule of
probable cause is a practical, nontechnical conception
20

affording the best compromise that has been found for
accommodating these often opposing interests.
Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforcement. To
allow less would be to leave law-abiding citizens at
the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice.
ffpurgeon, 904 P.2d at 226 (quoting Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 176, 69
S. Ct. at 1311).
Here, the odor of alcohol on defendant's breath, the
presence of an opened 12-pack of beer with approximately half of
the containers missing, and coolers in which cold beer might have
been stored within defendant's and Willey's reach, collectively
suggest that there was a "substantial chance" that defendant had
an open container of beer in his van.

The trial court's finding

of probable cause should therefore be affirmed.4

STATEMENT EESAEPtW? NEEP FOR PRM* ARgtfliENT
AND DESIRABILITY OF OFFICIAL PUBLICATION
The facts of this case are straightforward, and the legal
doctrines at issue are well established.

The State therefore

does not request oral argument or the issuance of an opinion
designated wFor Official Publication."
In the event this Court decides to schedule oral argument in
either this case or in co-defendant Willey's case, State v.

4

With respect to defendant's exigent circumstances
argument, this Court need only recognize that defendant's van was
stopped on a public highway. Assuming the establishment of
probable cause, the van was therefore subject to a warrantless
search under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.
State v. Anderson. 283 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 18 (Utah 1996).
21

Willey. No. 950644-CA, then oral argument should be granted in
both cases.

CONCISION
Based on the foregoing arguments, defendant's convictions
should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / J ^ d a y of March, 1996.
JAN GRAHAM
Utah Attorney General

Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appeals Division
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ADDENDUM A
Transcript of Trial Court's Oral Findings of Fact and
Denial of Defendant's Motion to Suppress

1

owned the dog.
THE COURT: Well, in this case, the officer

2
3

had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle, and I find

4

that the officer, once he notified the driver of that, that

5

the officer then from that point on was just acting as any

6

citizen would do in helping them to do what it is they

7

wanted to do. This was a voluntary act on Mr. Patefield's

8

part in going back to fix it right now.

9

do that. And, it should have been clear to him from what

He didn't have to

10

the officer —

11

he didn't have to do that then.

12

And, therefore, this became —

13

2 or a level 2 brief investigatory detention to a level 1

14

citizen police encounter, which requires no reasonable

15

suspicion or probable cause. Something that anybody can do.

16

A police officer can walk up to you on the street any time,

17

and you, also, have the right to say, "Sorry officer, I

18

don't want to talk to you right now."

19

make you stand —

20

a reasonable suspicion.

21

from his conversation with the officer that
He volunteered to do it.

this reverted from a citizen

And if he wants to

stop and talk to you, then he has to have

Even if Mr. Patefield would have understood or did

22

understand or reasonably understood from his conversation

23

with the officer that he had to stay there, and he had to gcj

24

fix it right then, well that —

25

intentionally or mistakenly communicated that to them, it

Well, if the officer either!

If. Jane Musselman
stiffed Court Transcriber
P.O. Box 531
llontkeOo, Utah 84535
ekpbooe (801) 587-2351
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1

was still something that —

that was something the officer

2

was entitled to do.

3

the law here, which the officer had the right to cite or see}

4

corrected on the spot. And, so if Mr. Patefield understood

5

it that way and that's why he felt compelled to walk to the

6

back of the car, that was something that was perfectly

7

permissible as well.

8

level 2 citizen-police encounter with no expanded scope,

9

that is, the scope is the license plate light period.

There was, after all, a violation of

It just meant that it remained at a

So,

10

whether it was a level 1 or level 2 stop at the time where

11

he smelled the —

12

Patefield's breath, the officer had the right to be there.

13

And, he smelled the odor of alcohol on Mr. Patefield's

14

breath.

15

observed these cartons, these twelve packs of beer, one of

16

which had been opened and containers from which were

17

missing.

18

worth addressing is whether the probable —

19

combination of those things taken in view of all the

20

circumstances, these twelve packs of beer, one of which had

21

clearly been opened and from which containers were missing

22

combined with the odor of alcohol on a driver's breath,

23

whether those combined make it more likely than not that

24

there will be —

25

container in the vehicle or that there has been someone in

the officer smelled the alcohol on Mr.

He had, also, being where he had every right to be,]

And, really the only question I think in this case)
whether the

that this individual has had an open

ii. June Musselman
Certified Court Transcriber
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lfooticeDo,UtthM535
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1

the vehicle with an open container of alcohol or drinking

2

alcohol in the vehicle. So, in a sense the probable cause

3

standard has been referred to as a more-likely-than-not

4

standard*

5

there probable cause to believe that there may be ...? And,!

6

in other settings, it seems like what they expect is

7

something more than just more likely than not, and it seems

8

to be driven in some sense by public policy concerns. For

9

example, I ruled a couple of weeks ago that a driver having|

Sometimes it's referred to as something less: is

10

a smell — odor of alcohol on — a passenger with the odor

11

of alcohol on the passenger's breath is not reasonable

12

suspicion to inquire concerning open containers or ask for

13

consent to search for open containers. And the public

14

policy concern there was how else — what are you going to

15

do with designated drivers? Are we going to even though

16

these people got a designated driver or they called a cab,

17

are they still subject to be arrested because they have

18

alcohol on their breath?

19

I don't see a strong public policy here, and I address

20

the question simply as what I think is more likely than not.

21

If we stopped a hundred cars on the road which had a driver

22

with the odor of alcohol on his breath, an open twelve-pack

23

of beer with containers missing from it and you didn't know

24

anything more than that, would fifty-one of those be

25

situations where there was an open container of alcohol in

M. Jane Mustelman
GcrUOcd Court Transcriber
P.O. Box 531

1

the vehicle.

2

case, it turned out that there wasn't.

3

than fifty-one cases out of a hundred, you would —

4

would find an open container of alcohol with this

5

combination of circumstances.

6

there was probable cause to search this vehicle for open

7

containers. And, in the process of that search, the officer}

8

looked in one of the most likely places, right behind the

9

driver's seat, and in that process smelled the odor of

I think there would be.

I think —

In this

But, I think more
you

For that reason, I find that

10

marijuana, which then gave, under the (inaudible) probable

11

cause, to search for marijuana.

12

marijuana, and once he found that, other drugs.

13

He was able to search for

The question of Mr. Wiley's statement in response to a

14

question, I find that that was interrogation because the

15

officer by this time had seen the dog tag.

16

isn't it?

17

asking that question not just out of ideal curiosity, but —I

18

not to pass the time of day, but to connect Mr. Wiley to the)

19

dog tag, which tied him to the fanny pack in which the

20

marijuana was located.

21

there is whether Mr. Wiley was in custody.

22

believe Mr. Wiley was in custody.

23

circumstances of this case, I believe Mr. Wiley was acting

24

to help Mr. Patefield out —

25

impoundment of his vehicle and was simply driving up to the

That's right

By this time he had seen the dog tag, so he was

The other prong of the analysis
And I don't

From all the facts and

helping Mr. Patefield avoid

i£. Jane Musselman
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1

police station to receive his citation for the possession of]

2

paraphernalia and to find out what was going to be happening

3

with Mr. Patefield so that he could decide whether he wanteq

4

to go on to his eventual designation or wait for him here.

5

And, therefore, I find Mr. Wiley was not in custody.

6

not —

7

in an interrogation room.

8

driven there freely, that is choosing —

9

Now, he had not be able to, once he accepted the assignment

He was]

he was at the Public Safety Building, but he was not
He was not hand cuffed.

He had

driving himself.

10

he wasn't free to drive off. He needed to come there in

11

order to receive his citation.

12

accusatory question.

13

he was being subjected to the third degree, "tel me the

14

truth or else."

15

therefore, there was no Miranda Warning required.

16

—

17

But, the —

it was not an

It was simply, I mean, it wasn't like

So, I find he was not in custody, and
He is not]

I will not suppress that statement.
I think that addresses all of the issues. Mr. Halls,

18

you may wish to make Findings and Conclusions.

19

cover this in sufficient detail for appellant review.

20

MS REILLY:

I tired to

Your Honor, with respect to that,

21

I think that one thing I would like to see in the Findings

22

of Fact is the fact the officer testified that he took Mr.

23

Wiley's driver's license from him when he left and had Mr.

24

Wiley follow him back.

25

THE COURT: Okay.

I take it he took that so

M. Jane Mustelman
Certified Court Transcriber
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1

he could use it to write out the citation.

2

that Mr. Wiley was going to need to come to the Public

3

Safety Building in order to get his citation and his license}

4

back.

5

MS REILLY:

But, it did mean|

Your Honor, with respect to this

6

matter and in light of the court's ruling, we wish to enter

7

conditional pleas of guilty at this time and ask the court

8

accept the conditional pleas, because we intend to notice ofl

9

appeal on this matter.

And, also, I would ask in advance iq

10

the court would stay the sentence pending appeal. I

11

understand that Mr. Wiley has a bail.

12

that's already set up.

13
14

I'm advised —

a bail]

THE COURT: Are you agreeing to a conditional
plea here, Mr. Halls?
MR. HALLS: Well, I was just trying to run

15
16

through it in my mind.

If we go through a trial in the

17

matter and spend a couple of days, then they can still

18

appeal it on the same issue.

19

anything by not agreeing to conditional —

20

pleas.

21

charged, they can appeal it back to the trial anyway, so I

22

guess I really don't have any objection to it.

So, I'm not sure I gain

If they're going to plead to the —

23

THE COURT: Okay.

24

MS REILLY:

25

M. Jane Mussdman
Certified Court Traaacriber
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Your Honor?

conditional
to this as

Do you wish us to come forward,

